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A newly published paper by IBME postdocs Giovanni Spitale and Federico Germani, and by our director Nikola Biller-Andorno, titled "Disruptive Technologies and Open Science: How Open Should Open Science Be? A ‘Third Bioethics’ Ethical Framework," offers a fresh perspective on the ethical dimensions of Open Science (OS) in the context of disruptive technologies. Disruptive technologies, such as generative AI, are powerful tools with the potential for significant societal impact. However, their open dissemination through OS practices presents ethical dilemmas. Drawing on Van Rennselaer Potter's concept of a ‘third bioethics,’ the authors introduce an ethical framework that challenges the conventional ‘as open as possible’ approach. They argue for a nuanced consideration of openness as a means to achieving broader ethical values rather than as an end in itself. This work is a critical contribution to the ongoing conversation about the responsible application of OS in an era of rapid technological change.
Abstract:
This paper investigates the ethical implications of applying open science (OS) practices on disruptive technologies, such as generative AIs. Disruptive technologies, characterized by their scalability and paradigm-shifting nature, have the potential to generate significant global impact, and carry a risk of dual use. The tension arises between the moral duty of OS to promote societal benefit by democratizing knowledge and the risks associated with open dissemination of disruptive technologies. Van Rennselaer Potter's ‘third bioethics’ serves as the founding horizon for an ethical framework to govern these tensions. Through theoretical analysis and concrete examples, this paper explores how OS can contribute to a better future or pose threats. Finally, we provide an ethical framework for the intersection between OS and disruptive technologies that tries to go beyond the simple ‘as open as possible’ tenet, considering openness as an instrumental value for the pursuit of other ethical values rather than as a principle with prima facie moral significance.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-024-00502-3